To what extent are people's moral judgments susceptible to subtle factors of which they are unaware? Here we show that we can change people's moral judgments outside of their awareness by subtly biasing perceived causality. Specifically, we used subtle visual manipulations to create visual illusions of causality in morally relevant scenarios, and this systematically changed people's moral judgments. After demonstrating the basic effect using simple displays involving an ambiguous car collision that ends up injuring a person (E1), we show that the effect is sensitive on the millisecond timescale to manipulations of task-irrelevant factors that are known to affect perceived causality, including the duration (E2a) and asynchrony (E2b) of specific task-irrelevant contextual factors in the display. We then conceptually replicate the effect using a different paradigm (E3a), and also show that we can eliminate the effect by interfering with motion processing (E3b). Finally, we show that the effect generalizes across different kinds of moral judgments (E3c). Combined, these studies show that obligatory, abstract inferences made by the visual system influence moral judgments.
Introduction
We have less control of our moral judgments than we might think. Converging evidence shows that priming, highlighting, or framing one factor over another can influence moral judgments (Gu, Zhong, & PageGould, 2013; Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993; Petrinovich & O'Neill, 1996; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005) . Furthermore, scientists have also exploited the dynamics of eye gaze while subjects are making a moral decision to bias subjects toward making one particular moral decision over another (Pärnamets et al., 2015) .
Here we hypothesized that, in addition to being susceptible to such behavioral manipulations, moral judgments should also be susceptible to quirks of how the visual system automatically interprets the world. Specifically, we predicted and found that certain visual illusions, when present within a moral context, will distort the perception of causal relations in those moral contexts, leading people to make different moral judgments than they otherwise would. Furthermore, we used manipulations that had this effect without observers ever being aware that their moral judgments were being changed. This does not mean that moral judgments are not also influenced by non-visual factors (e.g., knowing that a person is a criminal). Yet insofar as our subtle, unrecognized visual manipulations changed moral judgments, this suggests that moral judgments about these visual scenes are based on causal information that is read out from the visual system.
In the introduction that follows, we explain why we have chosen to use visual illusions as well as what is known about visual illusions of causality per se. Next, we discuss how causal perception might be linked to cognitive processing, focusing on moral judgment as a case study.
Visual Illusions, and the distinction between perception and cognition
Visual illusions are perceived images or events that differ from objective reality. The best illusions exploit knowledge of how the visual system works in order to make people see features or events that are not an accurate reflection of the world, thereby illustrating the nature of the visual inferences that underlie perception.
By 'visual illusion' we will refer specifically to 'toy' displays that have been deliberately designed to demonstrate that the visual system has made an inference that goes beyond the literal features of the objects or their retinal projections (the experimenters know this, of course, because they created the stimuli). For instance, a perceiver can be tricked into seeing movement in a still image (waterfall illusion; Crane, 1988), or seeing two objects as having different brightness when they are in fact identical (shadow illusion; Adelson, 1999 ). Yet although these are toy displays, it is likely that the mechanisms uncovered in the illusion also operate on naturalistic stimuli. Indeed, it is likely that
